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Shirin Jalali and Tracey Ho
Abstract
In this paper we study the problem of secure communication over networks in which an unknown subset of
nodes or links can be wiretapped. We first consider a general multi-terminal discrete memoryless network (DMN)
described by its channel transition function from network inputs to network outputs, observed by network nodes and
the eavesdropper. We prove that in such general networks with multiple sources and sinks, the capacity regions subject
to strong and weak secrecy requirements are equal. We then focus on the special case of noiseless wiretap networks,
i.e., wired networks of noiseless point-to-point directed channels, where an unknown subset of links, selected from
a known collection of such subsets, can be wiretapped. We derive inner and outer bounds on the capacity regions of
such networks in terms of the entropic region, for both zero probability of error and asymptotically zero probability
of error.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the problem of secure communication over multi-terminal discrete memoryless networks (DMN), where
the communication channel is described by a general transition function from the network nodes inputs to their
outputs. An adversary eavesdrops on an unknown subset of nodes selected from a known collection. The goal is
to maximize the transmitted data rates while leaking as little information as possible to the eavesdropper.
Different notions of secrecy have been developed in the literature to quantify the information leakage to the
adversary. In general, most of such notions can be categorized as either computational or information theoretic.
In this paper, we focus on the latter, where the information leakage is usually measured in terms of the mutual
information between the adversary’s observations and the source messages. Depending on the convergence rate
of the defined mutual information to zero, the system is said to achieve perfect secrecy, strong secrecy or weak
secrecy. If the mutual information between the source messages and the adversary’s observations is exactly equal
to zero, then the system is perfectly secure. In that case, the source messages and the information available to the
adversary are completely independent. In the case of strong secrecy, the described mutual information is required
to get arbitrarily small as the blocklength grows, which implies almost independence. Finally, in the weak secrecy
model, the mutual information is normalized by the blocklength, and hence the “rate” of information leakage is
required to be arbitrarily small.
The problem of information theoretically secure communication was originally introduced by Shannon in [1].
He considered a point to point public channel, where a transmitter wants to send message M uniformly distributed
over {1, . . . , 2nRs} to a receiver. A private random key uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , 2nRk} is available to
both of them. The transmitter encodes its message M using key K into codeword W = W (M,K). The adversary
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2observes the encoded codeword W sent over the public channel, but does not have access to K . Shannon proved
that to ensure perfect secrecy, i.e., I(W ;M) = 0, the rate of the key, Rk, should at least be as large as the source
data rate Rs. This rate is also sufficient; in fact, letting Rk = Rs, a simple linear code, W = M ⊕K , achieves the
capacity in this model.
Secure communication over a wiretap channel was defined by Wyner in [2]. There the transmitter attempts to
send a message to the receiver over a broadcast channel described by p(y, z|x). The intended receiver observes
output y of the channel, while an adversary observes output z. In [3], it was shown that the secrecy capacity, Cs,
of the wiretap channel subject to the weak secrecy constraint is equal to Cs = maxp(u,x)(I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;Z)).
Subsequently it was shown in [4] that in fact Cs is also the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel subject to the
strong secrecy requirement, i.e., I(M ;Zn) ≤ ǫ instead of I(M ;Zn) ≤ nǫ.
The problem of secure communication over wiretap networks was proposed and studied in [5]. In a wiretap
network, data communication takes place over a noiseless wired network of point-to-point directed links. An
adversary observes the messages sent over a subset of links. In [5] and its subsequent work [6], the authors
considered a multicast problem where all messages and keys are generated at a single source, and defined secure
network coding capacity subject to zero-error communication and perfect secrecy. When all the links have unit
capacity and the adversary can choose to access any subset of links of size at most r, they proved that the secrecy
capacity is equal to cs = n − r, where n denotes the max-flow capacity from the source to all sinks. Moreover,
they proved that linear codes are sufficient to achieve cs. (Refer to [7] for a comprehensive review of the literature
on linear network coding subject to security constraints.)
The problem of general multi-source multi-destination secure network coding was studied in [8], which considered
asymptotically zero error communication subject to weak secrecy constraint and presented inner and outer bounds
on the set of achievable rates. The outer bound and the inner bound were presented in terms of “almost entropic
pseudo-variables” and random variables, respectively, each satisfying certain conditions. In [9] the authors present an
outer bound in terms of entropic region on the network coding capacity region subject to weak secrecy requirement.
In this paper we extend the above results in several directions. We first consider a general DMN, described by a
general channel transition function from network inputs to outputs observed by network nodes and the eavesdropper.
We prove that in such general networks, with multiple sources and multiple sinks, the capacity regions subject to
weak and strong secrecy are equal. DMNs are often used to model general wireless networks. Hence, this result
establishes the equivalence of the capacity regions subject to strong and weak secrecy requirements in communication
of independent sources over general noisy memoryless channels. This result is a generalization of [4], where the
same result was proved for a single wiretap channel. We extend the approach of [4] to general networks with arbitrary
communication demands among multiple terminals. The main ingredient of the proof in [4] is “extractor functions”,
a well-studied tool in computer science. We employ the same machinery here. The main difference between our
work and [4] is that here we consider a general secure network coding problem with multiple sources and multiple
sinks. As a corollary, our result also proves that the network coding capacity regions of noiseless wiretap networks
with asymptotically zero probability of error subject to strong secrecy and subject to weak secrecy are equal.
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3We then focus on the special case of wiretap networks, defined as an error-free network of directed point-to-point
links with an adversary eavesdropping on an unknown subset of links chosen from a given collection of subsets. A
typical example of such collections is the set of all up to r-link subsets of edges. The selected edges are not known
to the communicating users, and the goal is to maximize the communication rates while not leaking information
to the eavesdropper. For such networks we derive inner and outer bounds on the zero-error capacity region subject
to weak secrecy constraint in terms of “entropic region”. As will be explained later, in this case we consider
variable-length coding across the channels. We also derive inner and outer bounds on the capacity region subject
to weak secrecy constraint and asymptotically zero probability of decoding error in terms of entropic region. Our
outer bound is tighter than the bound derived in [9]. Our first result, i.e., equivalence of network coding capacity
regions subject to weak and strong secrecy requirements, states that the inner and outer bounds also hold in the
case of strong secrecy.
In [10], [11], the authors consider networks of wiretap channels. In the case where the eavesdropper has access
only to the output of one channel chosen from a known collection, they show that the weak secrecy capacity region
is equal to the weak secrecy capacity region of another network derived by replacing each noisy wiretap channel by
an equivalent noiseless model. Our result proves that both for the wired network and wireless network the capacity
regions do not shrink by requiring strong secrecy. Therefore, it shows the equivalence established in [10], [11] also
holds under strong secrecy condition.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II defines the notations used throughout the paper, and also
summarizes the definitions and some relevant properties of typical sequences and the entropic region. In Section
III, we extend the result proved in [4] for wiretap channels to general DMNs and show that the capacity regions
of a general DMN subject to weak and strong secrecy requirements are the same. Section IV reviews the noiseless
wiretap network model and defines the secure network coding capacity region of such networks under different
notions of secrecy and also different probability of error requirements. Section V and VI present inner and outer
bounds on the network coding capacity region under weak secrecy constraint, for zero error and asymptotically
zero error, respectively. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
A. Notation
For integers i ≤ j, let [i : j] , {i, i+1, . . . , j}. Random variables are denoted by upper case letters such as X . For
random variable X , let script letter X denote its alphabet set. Given vector (X1, . . . , Xn) and set α ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
let Xα , (Xi : i ∈ α). For a set X , let 2X denote the set of all subsets of X . For set A, A denotes its closure,
and con(A) denotes its convex closure, which is defined as the smallest closed and convex set containing A.
For x,y ∈ Rn, x ≤ y, if and only if, xi ≤ yi, for all i = 1, . . . , n. For A ⊂ Rn, let
Λ(A) , {x ∈ Rn : x ≤ y, for some y ∈ A}.
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D(A) , {αx : α ∈ [0, 1],x ∈ A}.
For I ⊂ [1 : n] and A ⊂ Rn, define the projection operation Proj(·) over the coordinated defined by I as
ProjI(A) , {xI : x ∈ A},
where xI = (xi : i ∈ I).
The total variation distance between probability distributions p1 and p2 defined over set X is defined as dTV(p1, p2) ,
0.5
∑
x∈X |p1(x)−p2(x)|. The “min-entropy” of random variable X with pdf p(x) : X → R+, H∞(X), is defined
as
H∞(X) , min
x∈X
log
1
p(x)
.
B. Typical sequences
For a sequence xn ∈ Xn, the empirical distribution of xn is defined as
π(x|xn) , |{i : xi = x}|
n
,
for all x ∈ X . For (xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn, the joint empirical distribution of (xn, yn) is defined as
π(x, y|xn, yn) , |{i : (xi, yi) = (x, y)}|
n
,
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
We adopt the definition of strongly typical sequences introduced in [12]. Given random variable X distributed
as p(x), x ∈ X , and ǫ ∈ (0, 1), the set of ǫ-typical sequences of length n is defined as
T (n)ǫ (X) , {xn : |π(x|xn)− p(x)| ≤ ǫ · p(x), ∀ x ∈ X}.
Similarly, for random variables (X,Y ) jointly distributed as p(x, y),
T (n)ǫ (X,Y ) , {(xn, yn) : |π(x, y|xn, yn)− p(x, y)| ≤ ǫ · p(x, y), ∀ (x, y) ∈ X × Y}.
Given discrete random variable X ,
(1− ǫ)2n(1−ǫ)H(X) < |T (n)ǫ (X)| < 2n(1+ǫ)H(X), (1)
for n large enough [13].
Consider discrete random variable X , and assume that Y = g(X), where g : X → Y is a deterministic function.
Lemma 1: If xn ∈ T (n)ǫ (X), and yn = g(xn), i.e., yi = g(xi), then yn ∈ T (n)ǫ (Y ).
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5Proof: For y ∈ Y , define Xy , {x ∈ X : g(x) = y}. Since g is a deterministic function, (Xy : y ∈ Y) forms
a partition of X . For every y ∈ Y , we have
n−1|π(y|xn)− p(y)| = |π(y|yn)−
∑
x∈Xy
p(x)|
=
∣∣∣ ∑
x∈Xy
π(x|xn)−
∑
x∈Xy
p(x)
∣∣∣
≤
∑
x∈Xy
|π(x|xn)− p(x)|
≤
∑
x∈Xy
ǫ · p(x)
= ǫ · p(y), (2)
which, by definition, shows that yn ∈ T (n)ǫ (Y ).
Lemma 1 simplifies our analysis in the next sections. Note that X in Lemma 1 can also be a vector, (X1, . . . , Xm),
where X1, . . . , Xm are jointly distributed finite-alphabet random variables. In that case, for Y = g(X1, . . . , Xm),
by Lemma 1, if (xn1 , . . . , xnm) ∈ T (n)ǫ (X1, . . . , Xm) and yi = g(x1,i, . . . , xm,i), i = 1, . . . , n, then yn ∈ T (n)ǫ (Y )
as well.
C. Entropic region
In this section, following the notations used in [14], we briefly review the definitions of the entropy function of
random variables and the entropic region.
Assume that (X1, . . . , Xn) are n jointly distributed finite-alphabet random variables. Define h ∈ R2n to denote
the entropy function of (X1, . . . , Xn) defined as follows. For α ⊆ [1 : n],
hα , H(Xα) = H(Xi : i ∈ α).
For α = ∅, hα = 0. Let Hn denote the set of all possible 2n dimensional vectors whose components are labeled
by the 2n subsets of [1 : n]. A vector h ∈ Hn is called entropic, if and only if h is equal to the entropy function
of n jointly distrusted finite-alphabet random variables (X1, . . . , Xn). The entropic region Γ∗n is defined as the set
of all possible entropic vectors of n random variables, i.e.,
Γ∗n , {h ∈ Hn : h is entropic}.
While Γ∗n is not in general a convex set, it is known that its closure Γ∗n is a convex cone [14]. Characterizing the
entropic region is a fundamental open problem in information theory.
Entropy function is a submodular function, i.e., given jointly distributed discrete random variables X1, . . . , Xn,
for any α, β ⊆ [1 : n],
H(Xα∩β) +H(Xα∪β) ≤ H(Xα) +H(Xβ),
November 17, 2017 DRAFT
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p(y1, . . . , ym|x1, . . . , xm)
→ Xj
← Yj
Fig. 1. General discrete memoryless network (DMN)
Let Γn ⊆ Hn denote the set of vectors in Hn that satisfy the basic inequalities of Shannon’s information measures
[15], i.e.,
Γn , {h ∈ Hn : i(α ;β|γ) ≥ 0, ∀ α, β, γ ⊆ [1 : n]},
where i(α;β|γ) , I(Xα;Xβ|Xγ). It is known that for n = 2, Γ2 = Γ∗n and for n = 3, Γ∗3 6= Γ3, but Γ∗3 = Γ3.
But for n > 3, it is known that Γ∗n ⊂ Γn [14].
III. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS NETWORKS
Consider a general discrete memoryless network (DMN). (See Fig. 1.) Let V denote the set of m nodes
in the network. The channel is described by its transition function {p(ym|xm)}(xm,ym)∈Xm×Ym . Node i ∈ V
communicates with other nodes in the network through controlling input Xi of the channel and receiving output
Yi. Let S ⊂ V denote the set of source nodes in the network. Also let A denote the collection of potential sets of
adversaries. Each α ∈ A represents a subset of V that might be accessed by the adversary. The adversary chooses
one and only one subset α ∈ A and observes the outputs of the nodes in α. Clearly, S ∩ α = ∅, for α ∈ A. The
goal is to minimize the data leakage to the adversary, while maximizing the throughput.
The coding operations are performed as follows. Each node s ∈ S observes message Ms ∈ [1 : 2nrs ], and desires
to communicate this message to a subset of nodes Ds ⊂ V\s. The messages are described to the destination nodes
through a code of block length n. At time i ∈ [1 : n], node s ∈ S, based on its received signals up to time i − 1
and its own message Ms generates its channel input Xs,i as Xs,i = fs,t(Ms, Y i−1s ), where
fs,i : [1 : 2
nrs ]× Yi−1s → Xs.
At time i ∈ [1 : n], node v ∈ V\S generates its channel input Xv,i as a function of its received signals as
Xv,i = fv,i(Y
i−1
v ), where
fv,i : Yi−1v → Xv.
Let Mˆs→t denote the reconstruction of message Ms at node t ∈ Ds. If node t ∈ Ds is also a source node, i.e.,
t ∈ S, then it reconstructs Ms as a function of its received signals Y nt and its own message Mt. In other words,
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7Mˆs→t = gs→t(Y nt ,Mt), where
gs→t : Ynt × [1 : 2nrt ]→ [1 : 2nrs ].
If node t ∈ Ds is not a source node, i.e., t /∈ S, then it reconstructs Ms only as a function of its received signals
Y nt . In other words, Mˆs→t = gs→t(Y nt ), where
gs→t : Ynt → [1 : 2nrs ].
Coding rate vector (rs : s ∈ S) is said to be achievable subject to “weak” secrecy, if for any ǫ > 0 and n large
enough, there exists a code of blocklength n at message rates (r(n)s : s ∈ S), such that
i. Source rates: For every s ∈ S,
r(n)s ≥ rs − ǫ.
ii. Reliable reconstructions: For every s ∈ S and t ∈ Ds,
P(Ms 6= Mˆs→t) ≤ ǫ.
iii. Secrecy: For every α ∈ A,
1
n
I(Y nα ;MS) ≤ ǫ,
where MS = (Ms : s ∈ S) and Y nα = (Y nv : v ∈ α).
Coding rate vector (rs : s ∈ S) is said to be achievable subject to “strong” secrecy, if for any ǫ > 0 and n large
enough, there exists a code with blocklength n and source rates (r(n)s : s ∈ S), such that the following constraints
are satisfied:
i. Source rates: For s ∈ S,
r(n)s ≥ rs − ǫ.
ii. Reliable reconstructions: For every s ∈ S and t ∈ Ds,
P(Ms 6= Mˆs→t) ≤ ǫ.
iii. Secrecy: For every α ∈ A,
I(Y nα ;MS) ≤ ǫ.
Given an m-node DMN described by p(ym|xm), source nodes S and collection of sets of potential adversaries A,
let R(w)(p(ym|xm),S,A) denote its set of achievable rates (capacity region) subject to weak secrecy. Similarly,
let R(s)(p(ym|xm),S,A) denote its set of achievable rates (capacity region) subject to strong secrecy.
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8A. Strong versus weak secrecy
In this section we prove that for any general DMN, the capacity region subject to weak secrecy is equal to the
capacity region subject to strong secrecy. This result is proved in [4] for wiretap channels. Here, we extend this
result to general DMNs with multiple sources and multiple sinks.
Theorem 1: For any set of sources S ⊂ [1 : m], and any collection of sets of nodes A ⊂ 2[1:m] that are observed
by the adversary,
R(s)(p(ym|xm),S,A) = R(w)(p(ym|xm),S,A).
The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix A. As done in [4], to prove this result, we employ “extractor
functions”. Extractor functions are used in computer science to generate completely random bits with uniform
distributions. An extractor function usually has two inputs, some “weakly” random bits (source bits), and some
truly random bits (seed). The extractor function deterministically maps the inputs to an output bit stream that has
close to uniform distribution. In designing an extractor function, one goal is to make the length of the seed as short
as possible. Extractor functions have been extensively studied in computer science literature. (Refer to [16] and
[17] and the references therein for more information on this subject.)
Definition 1 ((δ′, ǫ′)-extractor [4]): Function E : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}n3 is called (δ′, ǫ′)-extractor, if
for any random variable T with T ⊆ {0, 1}n1 and H∞(T ) ≥ δ′n1,
dTV ([V,E(T, V )],W ) ≤ ǫ′,
where W and V are uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n2+n3 , and{0, 1}n2, respectively.
The above definition has a strong requirement that if we concatenate the output E(T, V ) and the seed bits V the
whole sequence has close to uniform distribution. In the literature, weaker notions, where one is only concerned
with the distribution of the output alone, has been studied as well. However, since in this paper, we are going
to apply extractor functions to network coding security applications, we use the stronger notion. The seed, in our
applications, is a random bit sequence that is sent from the source to all interested destinations, and is potentially
observed by all eavesdroppers. Hence, we need to measure security of the code conditioned on knowing the seed.
The following lemma from [18] shows the existence of efficient extractor functions and gives bounds on parameters
n2 and n3 in terms of n1, δ′ and ǫ′.
Lemma 2: Given n1, 0 < δ′ < 1, and ǫ′ > 0, there exists a (δ′, ǫ′)-extractor E : {0, 1}n1×{0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}n3,
such that
n2 = O((log(n1/ǫ
′))2 log(δ′n1)),
and
n3 = δ
′n1 − 2 log(1/ǫ′)− c,
where c = O(1).
Clearly, for every set As ⊂ 2E , R(s)0 ⊆ R(w)0 and R(s)ǫ ⊆ R(w)ǫ . We prove that, in case of asymptotically zero
probability of error, the other direction is true as well, i.e., R(w)ǫ = R(s)ǫ . A similar result is proved in [4] for
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9wiretap channels. There, the authors show that moving from weak secrecy to strong secrecy does not change the
secrecy capacity of wiretap channels. Here, we extend that result to wiretap networks. The main ingredient of our
proof in the following two lemmas from [4].
Lemma 3 (Lemma 9 in [4]): Let δ′, δ1, δ2 > 0. For any sufficiently large n1, there exists a functionE : {0, 1}n1×
{0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}n3 , where n2 ≤ δ1n1 and n3 ≥ (δ′ − δ2)n1, such that for every random variable T with
T ⊆ {0, 1}n1 and H∞(T ) ≥ δ′n1,
H(E(T, V )|V ) ≥ n3 − 2−
√
n1−δ0 ,
where δ0 = o(1), and V is independent of T uniformly distributed on {0, 1}n2 .
The proof of Lemma 3, follows from Lemma 2.
Lemma 4 (Lemma 10 in [4]): Let X and Y be two finite-alphabet random variables. For any λ > 0,
P (H∞(X)−H∞(X |Y = y) ≤ log |Y|+ λ) ≥ 1− 2−λ. (3)
Proof: Since the proof of Lemma 4 is omitted in [4], for completeness, we present the proof here. Note that
the probability in (3) is only in terms of p(y), not p(x). Let xm , argmaxx p(x), and xm(y) , argmaxx p(x|y).
From these definitions, we can rewrite the complement of the event mentioned in (3) as follows
P (H∞(X)−H∞(X |Y = y) > log |Y|+ λ)
= P
(
p(xm(Y )|Y ) > p(xm)2λ|Y|
)
.
By Markov inequality,
P
(
p(xm(Y )|Y ) > p(xm)2λ|Y|
)
<
E[p(xm(Y )|Y )]
p(xm)2λ|Y|
=
∑
y∈Y p(y)p(xm(y)|y)
p(xm)2λ|Y|
=
∑
y∈Y p(xm(y))p(y|xm(y))
p(xm)2λ|Y|
≤ p(xm)
∑
y∈Y p(y|xm(y))
p(xm)2λ|Y|
≤ p(xm)
∑
y∈Y 1
p(xm)2λ|Y|
≤ 2−λ, (4)
which concludes the proof.
IV. NOISELESS WIRETAP NETWORKS
Consider error-free communication network N described by acyclic directed graph G = (V , E) such that V and E
denote the set of nodes and edges in G, respectively. Each node v ∈ V denotes a user in the network and each edge
e = (v1, v2) ∈ E represents an error-free bit pipe of finite capacity ce. For each node v ∈ V , let In(v) and Out(v)
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denote the set of incoming and outgoing edges of node v, respectively. That is, In(v) , {(v1, v) : (v1, v) ∈ E}
and Out(v) , {(v, v2) : (v, v2) ∈ E}.
Let S ⊂ V and T ⊂ V denote the set of source nodes and sink nodes, respectively. Without loss of generality,
we assume that:
i) S ∩ T = ∅.
ii) Source nodes do not have incoming edges. That is, if s ∈ S, In(s) = ∅.
iii) Terminal nodes do not have outgoing edges. That is, if t ∈ T , Out(t) = ∅.
iv) Only source nodes generate keys1.
A secure network code of blocklength n operating on network N is defined as follows. Each source s ∈ S
observes message Ms and key Ks uniformly distributed over
Ms , [1 : 2⌊nrms⌋],
and
Ks , [1 : 2⌊nrks⌋],
respectively. Here, rms and rks represent the information rate and the key rate of source s, respectively.
Let We ∈ We denote the message traversing edge e ∈ E . While most of the network coding literature is
dedicated to fixed-length coding across channels, in this paper, we consider both variable-length and fixed-length
channel coding models, described as follows.
i) Fixed-length channel coding: In the fixed-length model, a bit pipe of capacity ce is defined to be an error-free
point-to-point channel, which carries at most nce bits in n transmissions. Therefore, in this case the rate of
the code used on channel e is defined as
r(f)e , n
−1 log |We|, (5)
or equivalently we can assume that2 We = [1 : 2nr(f)e ].
ii) Variable-length channel coding: In the variable-length coding regime, for a blocklength of n, the number of
bits sent over channel e with capacity ce is allowed to exceed nce. Therefore, in the case of variable-length
coding, the rate of the code, r(v)e , is measured as the average expected number of bits per channel use, or,
more precisely,
r(v)e , n
−1H(We). (6)
From the definition of r(v)e , unlike the case of fixed-length coding, in this case n−1 log |We| can be much
larger than ce.
1Note that this assumption is not restrictive. If node v ∈ V\(V ∪ S) desires to generate a key, we add a source node s′ to S and a directed
edge e′ = (s′, v) to E connecting s′ to v, with large enough capacity ce′ . Source s′ does not have any message, i.e.,Ms′ = ∅, but it generates
key Ks′ , and sends it directly to v′ through e′.
2Throughout the paper the basis of logarithm is assumed to be 2.
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As mentioned earlier, most of the literature on analyzing network coding capacity regions is dedicated to the
case of asymptotically zero probability of error where the channel code used on each point-point channel is a
fixed-length code. The reason in this paper we consider both fixed and variable length coding is that, here we focus
on both asymptotically zero and perfectly zero probability of error. While fixed-length coding is a proper model
for analyzing the capacity region of the former case, in the latter one, in order to avoid shrinking the achievable
capacity region by a significant amount, we move to the variable-length coding paradigm. The advantage of this
shift is that when using typical sets as the building blocks, variable-lengths codes allow us to once in a while send
a non-typical sequence, without hurting the performance significantly.
In [19], where the authors derive inner and outer bounds on the zero-error capacity region of acyclic networks
(with no security constraint), there too the authors consider variable-length coding across the channels. However,
at this point it is not clear to us, whether this shift of models is essential to the problem, or is a technical issue
that can be fixed later.
For each edge e = (v1, v2) ∈ E , the function ηe denotes the encoding operation performed by node v1 to generate
the message sent over edge e. If e ∈ Out(s), for some s ∈ S, then
ηe : Ms ×Ks → We,
and
We = ηe(Ms,Ks).
If e ∈ Out(v), where v ∈ V\(S ∪ T ), then
ηe :
∏
e′∈In(v)
We′ → We,
and We = ηe(We′ : e′ ∈ In(v)). Each terminal node t ∈ T reconstructs a subset β(t) ⊆ S of source messages. For
s ∈ β(t), let ηt,s denote the decoding function applied at terminal node t for decoding source s. More precisely,
ηt,s :
∏
e∈In(t)
We → Ms,
and
Mˆs→t = ηt,s(We : e ∈ In(t)),
where Mˆs→t represents the reconstruction of message Ms at node t.
Let As ⊂ 2E denote the set of security constraints described as follows. Each member α ∈ As represents a subset
of edges E . An eavesdropper can choose a set α ∈ As, and access the information transmitted on all the edges
e ∈ α. Our goal is to prevent the leakage of information to the eavesdropper such that asymptotically it does not
get any meaningful information about the source messages. In the following, this notion is defined more precisely.
1) Zero-error capacity region: Rate r = (rs : s ∈ S) is said to be achievable subject to weak secrecy with
respect to the set As ⊂ 2E at zero error rate, if for any ǫ > 0, there exists a code of blocklength n large
enough, message rates r(n)m = (r(n)ms : s ∈ S) and key rates r(n)k = (r(n)ks : s ∈ S), such that
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i. For every s ∈ S,
r(n)ms ≥ rs − ǫ.
ii. For every e ∈ E ,
r(v)e ≤ ce.
iii. For every α ∈ As,
n−1I(MS ;Wα) ≤ ǫ,
where MS = (Ms : s ∈ S) and Wα = (We : e ∈ α).
iv. For every t ∈ T , and s ∈ β(t),
P(Mˆs→t 6= Ms) = 0.
Rate r = (rs : s ∈ S) is said to be achievable subject to strong secrecy with respect to the set As ⊂ 2E at
zero error rate, if it satisfies identical conditions as those required for weakly-secure achievable rates, except
for condition (iii), where in this case we require
I(MS ;Wα) ≤ ǫ,
for every α ∈ As.
Let R(w)0 denote the set of all achievable weakly-secure rates with zero error. Similarly, let R(s)0 denote the
set of all achievable rates at zero error subject to strong security.
2) Asymptotically zero-error capacity region: Rate r = (rs : s ∈ S) is said to be achievable at asymptotically
zero error subject to weak secrecy with respect to the set As ⊂ 2E , if for any ǫ > 0, there exists a code with
blocklength n large enough with message rates r(n)m = (r(n)ms : s ∈ S) key rates r(n)k = (r(n)ks : s ∈ S), such
that
i. For every s ∈ S,
r(n)ms ≥ rs − ǫ.
ii. For every e ∈ E ,
r(f)e ≤ ce.
iii. For every α ∈ As,
n−1I(MS ;Wα) ≤ ǫ,
where MS = (Ms : s ∈ S) and Wα = (We : e ∈ α).
iv. For every t ∈ T , and s ∈ β(t),
P(Mˆs→t 6= Ms) ≤ ǫ.
Again, rate r = (rs : s ∈ S) is said to be achievable subject to strong secrecy with respect to the set
As ⊂ 2E at asymptotically zero error rate, if all the above conditions hold, except for condition (iii), which
is strengthened in this case as
I(MS ;Wα) ≤ ǫ,
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for every α ∈ As.
Let R(w)ǫ and R(s)ǫ denote the set of all weakly-secure and strongly-secure achievable rates at asymptotically
zero error, respectively.
Remark 1: We define the capacity constraint as r(v)e ≤ ce and r(f)e ≤ ce, in the case of zero error and
asymptotically zero error, respectively. This is stronger than the conditions usually considered in the network
coding literature, i.e., r(v)e ≤ ce + ǫ or r(f)e ≤ ce + ǫ, where ǫ can be made arbitrarily small [14]. We believe that
the stricter assumptions are more natural, because noiseless links of finite capacities are commonly used to model
noisy channels of equal capacities [20], [21], [22]. However, a noisy channel of capacity ce, at blocklength n, can
at most carry nce bits with arbitrarily small probability of error, which is equivalent to requiring r(v)e ≤ ce and
r
(f)
e ≤ ce.
Note that noiseless wiretap networks are almost a special case of DMNs. The only difference between the two
models is that in DMNs we assume that the adversary has access to the outputs of some nodes in the network,
while in wiretap networks, the eavesdropper listens to some links. However, the proof of Theorem 1 can readily
be extended to noiseless wiretap networks as well. The result is summarized in Corollary 1 of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1: For any wiretap network N described by graph G = (V , E), set of sources S, set of terminals T ,
(β(t) : t ∈ T ), and collection of potential sets of links As ⊂ 2E ,
R(w)ǫ = R(s)ǫ .
V. CAPACITY REGION: ZERO-ERROR CODING
In this section we derive inner and outer bounds on the secure network coding capacity region subject to weak
secrecy constraint and zero probability of error. As a reminder, in the case of zero-error communication, we consider
variable-length coding across the links.
Consider a set of finite-alphabet random variables ((Ums , Uks)s∈S , (Ue)e∈E) corresponding to the source mes-
sages, source keys and codewords sent over the edges. Define N , 2|S|+ |E| to denote the total number of such
random variables in the network. As defined earlier, Γ∗N denotes the entropic region defined by all possible set of
N finite-alphabet random variables.
Define sets Γ1, . . . ,Γ6 as follows:
Γ1 ,
{
h ∈ HN : hMs∪Ks =
∑
s∈S
(hms + hks)
}
, (7)
Γ2 ,
{
h ∈ HN : hms,ks,Out(s) = hms,ks , ∀ s ∈ S}, (8)
Γ3 ,
{
h ∈ HN : hIn(v)∪Out(v) = hIn(v), ∀ v ∈ V\S ∪ T }, (9)
Γ4 ,
{
h ∈ HN : hmβ(t),In(t) = hIn(t), ∀ t ∈ T }, (10)
Γ5 ,
{
h ∈ HN : he ≤ ce, ∀ e ∈ E}, (11)
Γ6 ,
{
h ∈ HN : hmS ,α = hmS + hα, ∀α ∈ As}. (12)
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For β ⊆ [1 : 6], let
Γβ ,
⋂
i∈β
Γi.
Also, for notational simplicity, sometimes instead of Γ{i,j}, we write Γij .
Define the projection operator ProjS(·) over the set HN as follows: for any vector h ∈ HN , f = ProjS(h) ∈ R|S|
and fs = hs, for all s ∈ S. In other words, ProjS(·) projects a vector in HN onto the coordinates corresponding
to the source messages.
Theorem 2 (Inner bound): Define
R0,i , Λ(ProjS(con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ12346) ∩ Γ5)).
Then, R0,i ⊆ R(w)0 .
Theorem 3 (Outer bound): Define
R0,o , Λ(ProjS(con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ1234) ∩ Γ56)).
Then, R(w)0 ⊆ R0,o.
Before proving Theorem 2, note that since Γ12346 is a linear subspace of HN , an straightforward extension of
Lemma 21.8 in [14] yields:
Lemma 5:
con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ12346) = D(Γ∗N ∩ Γ12346)
This result is used in the proof of the results.
A. Proof of Theorem 2
If r ∈ R(w)0 , then by our definition of achievability, any rate vector r′ ≤ r is also achievable. Hence, to prove
the theorem, it is enough to show that R′0,i , ProjS(con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ12346) ∩ Γ5) ⊆ R.
Let r ∈ R′0,i. By the definition of R′0,i and Lemma 5, there exists sequences h(k) ∈ Γ∗N ∩ Γ12346, ak ∈ (0, 1],
and ǫk ∈ (0, 1] such that, for any s ∈ S,
akh
(k)
ms
≥ rs − ǫk, (13)
for each edge e ∈ E ,
akh
(k)
e ≤ ce + ǫk, (14)
and ǫk → 0, as k grows to infinity.
Based on the sequence of entropic vectors h(k), we build a sequence of weakly secure network codes with zero
probability of error that asymptotically achieves rate r.
Since h(k) ∈ Γ∗N ∩ Γ12346, there exists a set of finite-alphabet random variables random variables, {Ums , Uks :
s ∈ S} ∪ {Ue : e ∈ E}, which satisfy the following:
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i. Random variables (Ums , Uks : s ∈ S) are all independent. That is,
H(Ums , Uks : s ∈ S) =
∑
s∈S
H(Ums) +
∑
s∈S
H(Uks). (15)
ii. For each outgoing edge e ∈ Out(s) of a source node s ∈ S, since hms,ks,Out(s) = hms,ks , there exists a
deterministic function ηe,
ηe : Ums × Uks → Ue, (16)
such that Ue = ηe(Ums , Uks).
iii. Similarly, for each edge e = (v1, v2) with v1 /∈ S, since hIn(v1),Out(v1) = hIn(v1), there exists a deterministic
function ηe,
ηe :
∏
e′∈In(v1)
Ue′ → Ue, (17)
such that Ue = ηe(Ue′ : e′ ∈ In(v1)).
iv. Corresponding to each sink node t ∈ T and source node s ∈ β(t), there exists a decoding function ηt,s,
ηt,s :
∏
e∈In(t)
Ue → Ums , (18)
such that Ums = ηt,s(Ue : e ∈ In(t)).
1) Random code construction: For each source s, consider the sets of ǫ-typical sequences T (nt)ǫ (Ums) and
T (nt)ǫ (Uks) and let
Ms , T (nt)ǫ (Ums),
and
Ks , T (nt)ǫ (Uks).
Moreover, define
|Ms| , 2nr(k)ms ,
and
|Ks| , 2nr
(k)
ks ,
where n denotes the blocklength of the code and will be specified later.
For edge e ∈ E , define random variable I(nt)e as an indicator function of whether the message traversing edge e
is a typical sequence, i.e.,
I(nt)e , 1Unte ∈T (nt)ǫ (Ue).
The blocklength n is defined as
n ,
⌈
nt(1 + δ)
ak
⌉
, (19)
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where
δ , 2
(
max
e∈E
(
(1 + ǫ)
(
1 +
ǫk
ce
)
+
ak log |Ue|P(I(nt)e = 0)
ce
)
− 1
)
. (20)
From this definition, for fixed ǫk, choosing nt large enough and ǫ small enough, δ can be made arbitrarily small.
After building the message and key codebooks in this manner, the encoding operations are performed as follows.
Each source s ∈ S chooses message Ms and key Ks uniformly at random from sets Ms and Ks, respectively.
Corresponding to each edge e ∈ Out(s), by applying the function ηe symbol-by-symbol to (Untms , Untks ), the source
constructs codeword We = Unte . In other words, for e ∈ Out(s), and i = 1, . . . , nt,
Ue,i = ηe(Ums,i, Uks,i). (21)
At node v ∈ V\(S ∪ T ), the codeword We sent over edge e ∈ Out(v) is constructed from (We′ )e′∈In(v) =
(Unte′ )e′∈In(v) by applying the function ηe symbol-by-symbol. That is, for i ∈ [1 : nt],
Ue,i = ηe(Ue′,i : e
′ ∈ In(v)). (22)
Finally, sink node t ∈ T reconstructs the message at source s ∈ β(t), Mˆs→t = Uˆntms , as a function of
(We)e∈In(t) = (Unte )e∈In(t), such that, for i = 1, . . . , nt,
Uˆms,i = ηt,s(Ue,i : e ∈ In(t)).
2) Performance evaluation:
i. Source rates: From (1), for nt large enough,
(1 − ǫ)2nt(1−ǫ)h(k)ms < |T (nt)ǫ (Ums)| < 2nt(1+ǫ)h
(k)
ms , (23)
where by our definition h(k)ms = H(Ums). Hence, by (13) and (19),
r(k)ms =
log |T (nt)ǫ (Ums)|
n
≥ nt
n
(1− ǫ)h(k)ms +
log(1− ǫ)
n
≥ nt(1− ǫ)
nt(1 + δ) + ak
(rs − ǫk) + ak log(1 − ǫ)
nt(1 + δ) + ak
. (24)
Choosing ǫk small enough, and then ǫ and nt appropriately, we can make the right hand side of (24) arbitrarily
close to rs, for all s ∈ S.
ii. Channels capacity constraints: As mentioned earlier, in the case of zero-error decoding, we consider variable-
length channel coding. Hence, to make sure that the capacity constraints are satisfied, we need to prove that
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H(We) ≤ nce, for all e ∈ E . To prove this, note that
H(We) ≤ H(We, Ie)
= H(Unte , Ie)
= H(Ie) +H(U
nt
e |Ie)
≤ 1 +H(Unte |Ie = 1)P(Ie = 1)
+H(Unte |Ie = 0)P(Ie = 0)
≤ 1 + log |T (nt)ǫ (Ue)|+H(Unte |Ie = 0)P(Ie = 0), (25)
where, for simplifying the notation, we have replaced I(nt)e in (25) by Ie. Again, for nt large enough,
(1− ǫ)2nt(1−ǫ)H(Ue) < |T (nt)ǫ (Unte )| < 2nt(1+ǫ)H(Ue). (26)
Combining (55), (19), (20), (25) and (26) yields
H(We) ≤ 1 + nt(1 + ǫ)H(Ue) + nt log |Ue|P(Ie = 0)
≤ 1 + nak
1 + δ
((1 + ǫ)h(k)e + log |Ue|P(Ie = 0))
≤ 1 + nak
1 + δ
((1 + ǫ)(
ce + ǫk
ak
) + log |Ue|P(Ie = 0))
≤ 1 + nce
1 + δ
(
(1 + ǫ)(1 +
ǫk
ce
) +
ak log |Ue|P(Ie = 0)
ce
)
≤ 1 +
(
1 + 0.5δ
1 + δ
)
nce
≤ nce, (27)
where the last step holds only for n large enough.
iii. Decoding error probability: We prove that the decoding error probability of the described code, i.e.,
P (n)e , P(Mˆs→t 6= Ms, for some t ∈ T , s ∈ β(t)),
is zero. To prove this, we show that P(Mˆs→t 6= Ms) = 0, for any t ∈ T and s ∈ β(t).
As mentioned earlier, since h(k) ∈ Γ4, the jointly distributed random variables (Ue)e∈E and (Ums , Uks)s∈S
satisfy
Ums = ηt,s(Ue : e ∈ In(t)),
for all t ∈ T and s ∈ β(t), where ηt,s(·) is a deterministic function. This implies that for any ums ∈ Ums ,
t ∈ T and uIn(t) ∈
∏
e∈In(t) Ue,
P(Ums = ums |UIn(t) = uIn(t)) = 1, (28)
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if ums = ηt,s(uIn(t)), and zero otherwise. Assume that for ums ∈ Us and uIn(t) ∈
∏
e∈In(t) Ue are such that
P(Uks = ums |UIn(t) = uIn(t)) = 0. Then, it follows that
0 =
∑
(umS\{s} ,ukS )∈∏
s′∈S\{s}
Um
s′
× ∏
s′∈S
Uk
s′
p(ums , umS\{s}, ukS |uIn(t))
=
∑
(umS\{s} ,ukS )
p(umS\{s} , ukS |uIn(t))p(ums |uIn(t), umS\{s}, ukS ). (29)
Therefore, from (29), for any umS\{s} ∈
∏
s′∈S\{s} Us′ and ukS ∈
∏
s′∈S Uks′ such that p(umS\{s}, ukS |uIn(t)) 6=
0, or equivalently p(umS\{s}, ukS |uIn(t)) 6= 0,
p(ums |uIn(t), umS\{s}, ukS ) = 0. (30)
Equation (30) implies that for any umS\{s} , ukS and uIn(t) such that there exists ums ∈ Ums , for which
applying encoding operations ηe(·) to input vectors umS , ukS results in the input edges of sink node t taking
values uIn(t), we have
ums = ηt,s(uIn(t)).
Clearly, by the union bound,
P(Uˆntms 6= Untms) ≤
nt∑
i=1
P(Uˆms,i 6= Ums,i). (31)
Hence to show that P(Uˆntms 6= Untms) = 0, it suffices to show that P(Uˆms,i 6= Ums,i) = 0, for all i = 1, . . . , nt.
But, the above argument guarantees that
P(Uˆms,i 6= Ums,i) = 0,
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
iv. Security guarantee: We prove that for any α ∈ As,
1
n
I(MS ;Wα) =
1
n
I(UntmS ;U
nt
α )
can be made arbitrarily small.
For any α ∈ As and untmS ∈
∏
s∈SMs, we have
P(Untα = u
nt
α |UntmS = untmS ) =
∑
u
nt
kS
∈Unt
kS
P(Untα = u
nt
α , U
nt
kS
= untkS |UntmS = untmS )
=
∑
u
nt
kS
∈Unt
kS
P(Untα = u
nt
α |UntkS = untkS , UntmS = untmS ) P(UntkS = untkS )
=
∑
u
nt
kS
∈Unt
kS
pKS (u
nt
kS
)
nt∏
i=1
pUα|UkS ,mS (uα,i|ukS ,i, umS ,i), (32)
where the last step follows from our symbol-by-symbol coding strategy described by (21) and (22).
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Let
KS ,
∏
s∈S
Ks.
At source node s ∈ S, the message and the key are drawn from a uniform distribution from Ms and Ks,
respectively. Hence, for untkS ∈ KS ,
P(UntkS = u
nt
kS
) =
∏
s∈S
1
|Ks| =
∏
s∈S
2−nr
(k)
ks = 2
−n ∑
s∈S
r
(k)
ks
.
For untkS ∈
∏
s∈S Untms\KS ,
pKS (u
nt
kS
) = 0.
For untks ∈ Ks, since Ks = T
(nt)
ǫ (Uks),
2−nth
(k)
ks
(1+ǫ) ≤ pUks (untks ) ≤ 2−nth
(k)
ks
(1−ǫ), (33)
where pUks (u
nt
ks
) =
∏nt
i=1 pUks (uks,i). On the other hand,
pKs(u
nt
ks
) =
1
|Ks| = 2
−nr(k)
ks . (34)
Combining (1), (33) and (34) yields
2−2ntǫh
(k)
ks pUks (u
nt
ks
) ≤ pKs(untks) ≤ (
1
1 − ǫ)2
2ntǫh
(k)
ks pUks (u
nt
ks
), (35)
for any untks ∈ Ks. For untks /∈ Ks, pKs(untks ) = 0, and hence
0 ≤ pKs(untks ) ≤ pUks (untks). (36)
Therefore, by inserting (35), and (36) in (32), it follows that
P(Untα = u
nt
α |UntmS = untmS )
=
∑
u
nt
kS
∈KS
pKS (u
nt
kS
)
nt∏
i=1
pUα|UkS ,mS (uα,i|ukS ,i, umS ,i)
(a)
≤
∑
u
nt
kS
∈Unt
kS
(
1
1− ǫ )
|S|2
2ntǫ(
∑
s∈S
h
(k)
ks
)
nt∏
i=1
pUα|UkS ,mS (uα,i|ukS ,i, umS ,i)pUks (uks,i)
≤ ( 1
1− ǫ )
|S|2
2ntǫ(
∑
s∈S
h
(k)
ks
)
nt∏
i=1
∑
ukS,i∈UkS
pUα|UkS ,mS (uα,i|ukS ,i, umS ,i)
∏
s∈S
pUks (uks,i), (37)
where (a) follows from the fact that pKS (untkS ) = 0, for untkS ∈ UntkS\KS .
By assumption, h(k) ∈ Γ6, and therefore, I(Uα;UmS ) = 0. This implies that, for any uα ∈ Uα and umS ∈
UmS , p(uα|umS ) = p(uα). Hence,
∑
ukS,i
pUα|UkS ,mS (uα,i|ukS ,i, umS ,i)
∏
s∈S
pUks (uks,i) =
∑
ukS,i
pUα,UkS |UmS (uα,i, ukS ,i|umS ,i)
= pUα|UmS (uα,i|umS ,i)
= pUα(uα,i). (38)
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Combining (37) and (38), it follows that
P(Untα = u
nt
α |UntmS = untmS ) ≤ (
1
1− ǫ )
|S|2
2ntǫ(
∑
s∈S
h
(k)
ks
)
nt∏
i=1
pUα(uα,i)
= (
1
1− ǫ )
|S|2
2ntǫ(
∑
s∈S
h
(k)
ks
)
pUα(u
nt
α ), (39)
or equivalently,
− 1
n
log P(Untα = u
nt
α |UntmS = untmS ) ≥ −
1
n
log pUα(u
nt
α ) +
|S| log(1− ǫ)
n
− 2ǫ(nt
n
)(
∑
s∈S
h
(k)
ks
). (40)
Multiplying both sides of (40) by P(UntmS = untmS , Untα = untα ) and taking the sum over all untα ∈ Untα and
untmS ∈ UntmS , we get
1
n
H(Untα |UntmS ) ≥
1
n
H(Untα ) +
∑
u
nt
α ∈Untα
P(Untα = u
nt
α ) log
P(Untα = u
nt
α )
pUα(u
nt
α )
+
|S| log(1 − ǫ)
n
− 2ǫ(nt
n
)(
∑
s∈S
h
(k)
ks
),
(41)
or, rearranging the terms,
1
n
I(Untα ;U
nt
mS
) +
∑
u
nt
α ∈Untα
P(Untα = u
nt
α ) log
P(Untα = u
nt
α )
pUα(u
nt
α )
≤ |S| log(1 − ǫ)
n
+ 2ǫ(
nt
n
)(
∑
s∈S
h
(k)
ks
). (42)
The second term on the left hand side of (42) is the Kullback Leibler distance between P(Untα = untα ) and
pUα(u
nt
α ) and hence is positive. Therefore,
1
n
I(Untα ;U
nt
mS
) ≤ |S| log(1− ǫ)
n
+ 2ǫ(
nt
n
)(
∑
s∈S
h
(k)
ks
). (43)
But letting n grow to infinity and choosing ǫ small enough, we can make the right hand side of (43) arbitrarily
small, for every α ∈ As.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
Let r ∈ R(w)0 be achievable. We prove that r ∈ R0,o. Since r ∈ R(w)0 , there exists a family of weakly secure
network codes of growing blocklength nℓ, source rates r(nℓ)mS and key rates r
(nℓ)
kS
, and a sequence (ǫℓ), ℓ ≥ 1, which
monotonically converges to zero, such that, for any source s ∈ S,
r(nℓ)ms ≥ rs − ǫℓ, (44)
and for any set of edges α ∈ As,
1
nℓ
I(MS ;Wα) ≤ ǫℓ. (45)
Let (M (ℓ)s ,K(ℓ)s )s∈S and (W (ℓ)e )e∈E denote the source messages, keys, and edge messages of the code of blocklength
nℓ, respectively.
Corresponding to each ℓ ∈ N, define N random variables (Y (ℓ)ms )s∈S , (Y (ℓ)ks )s∈S and (Y
(ℓ)
e )e∈E as follows. For
s ∈ S,
Y (ℓ)ms = M
(ℓ)
s , (46)
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and
Y
(ℓ)
ks
= K(ℓ)s , (47)
and for e ∈ E ,
Y (ℓ)e = W
(ℓ)
e . (48)
Let h(ℓ) denote the entropy function of the defined N random variables. From the independence of the source
messages and keys, it follows that
H((M (ℓ)s ,K
(ℓ)
s )s∈S) =
∑
s∈S
(H(M (ℓ)s ) +H(K
(ℓ)
s )).
Hence, h(ℓ) ∈ Γ1. Consider message W (ℓ)e transmitted on edge e = (v1, v2) ∈ E . If v1 is a source node, i.e.,
v1 ∈ S, then W (ℓ)e is a function of source message M (ℓ)s and key K(ℓ)s . In other words, H(W (ℓ)e |M (ℓ)s ,K(ℓ)s ) = 0,
or equivalently H(M (ℓ)s ,K(ℓ)s ,W (ℓ)e ) = H(M (ℓ)s ,K(ℓ)s ). Therefore, h(ℓ) ∈ Γ2. If v1 is not a source message, then
W
(ℓ)
e is a function of the messages traversing the incoming edges of node v1, and hence h(ℓ) ∈ Γ3 as well.
The code is assumed to have zero probability of error. Therefore, for each sink node t ∈ T , source messages in
β(t) are a deterministic function of the incoming message of node t. That is, for t ∈ T ,
H(M
(ℓ)
β(t)|W (ℓ)In(t)) = H((M (ℓ)s )s∈β(t)|(W (ℓ)e )e∈In(t)) = 0.
Hence, h(ℓ) ∈ Γ4 as well. Clearly, h(ℓ) is an entropic vector, i.e., h(ℓ) ∈ Γ∗N . Combining all these results, it follows
that
h(ℓ) ∈ Γ∗N ∩ Γ1234.
Moreover, 0 ∈ Γ∗N ∩ Γ1234. Therefore, since con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ1234) is a convex set,
(1 − n−1ℓ )0+ n−1ℓ h(ℓ) = n−1ℓ h(ℓ) ∈ con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ1234).
As mentioned earlier, at blocklength nℓ, the message transmitted on edge e, W (ℓ)e , should satisfy H(W (ℓ)e ) ≤ nℓce.
Therefore, n−1(ℓ)h
(ℓ) ∈ Γ5, and overall,
n−1ℓ h
(ℓ) ∈ con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ1234) ∩ Γ5. (49)
Given the sequence, ǫℓ, ℓ = 1, 2, . . ., define a sequence of sets as
Γ
(ℓ)
6 ,
{
h ∈ HN : hmS + hα − hmS ,α ≤ ǫℓ, ∀α ∈ As}. (50)
Combining (45) and (49), it follows that
n−1ℓ h
(ℓ) ∈ con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ1234) ∩ Γ5 ∩ Γ(ℓ)6 . (51)
To finish the proof, define
R(ℓ)o , Λ(ProjS(con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ1234) ∩ Γ5 ∩ Γ(ℓ)6 )). (52)
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By (44), n−1ℓ h(ℓ)s = n−1ℓ H(M (ℓ)s ) ≥ rs − ǫℓ for all s ∈ S. Combing this with (71), and (52), yields
r− ǫℓ ∈ R(ℓ)o .
Since ǫℓ is monotonically decreasing to zero, and since construction of R(ℓ)o involves applying the Λ(·) operation,
we have
r− ǫℓ ∈
∞⋂
ℓ′=ℓ
R(ℓ′)o .
On the other hand, for any ℓ ≥ 1,
∞⋂
ℓ′=ℓ
R(ℓ′)o = Ro.
Therefore, r− ǫℓ ∈ Ro, for ℓ ≥ 1. But, Ro is a closed set. Therefore, r ∈ Ro as well. This concludes the proof.
VI. CAPACITY REGION: ASYMPTOTICALLY ZERO-ERROR CODING
In this section we study capacity regions of wiretap networks with asymptotically zero-error reconstructions
subject to weak secrecy. We derive inner and outer bounds on the capacity regions of such networks.
Theorem 4 (Inner bound): Define
Rǫ,i , Λ(ProjS(con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ1236) ∩ Γ45)).
Then,
Rǫ,i ⊆ R(w)ǫ .
Theorem 5 (Outer bound): Define
Rǫ,o , Λ(ProjS(con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ123) ∩ Γ456)).
Then,
R(w)ǫ ⊆ Rǫ,o.
Note that, similar to Γ12346, Γ1236 is also a linear subspace of HN . Therefore, similar to Lemma 5, we have:
Lemma 6:
con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ1236) = D(Γ∗N ∩ Γ1236)
A. Proof of Theorem 4
Similar to the proof of Theorem 4, by Lemma 6, it suffices to show that R′ǫ,i , ProjS(D(Γ∗N ∩ Γ1236)∩Γ45) ⊆
R(w)ǫ .
For any r ∈ R′ǫ,i, by definition of R′ǫ,i, there exists sequences h(k) ∈ Γ∗N ∩Γ123456, ak ∈ (0, 1], and ǫk ∈ (0, 1],
k = 1, 2, . . ., such that, for any s ∈ S,
akh
(k)
ms
≥ rs − ǫk, (53)
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for each edge e ∈ E ,
akh
(k)
e ≤ ce + ǫk, (54)
for each terminal t ∈ T ,
h
(k)
mβ(t),In(t)
− h(k)In(t) ≤ ǫk, (55)
and ǫk → 0, as k grows to infinity.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we build a sequence of weakly secure network codes with asymptotically
zero probability of error based on the sequence of entropic vectors h(k).
Since h(k) ∈ Γ∗N ∩ Γ1236, there exists a set of finite-alphabet random variables random variables, {Ums , Uks :
s ∈ S} ∪ {Ue : e ∈ E}, which satisfy conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) corresponding to equations (15), (16) and (17),
respectively, which are listed in the proof of Theorem 2. The only difference is that since h(k) is no longer in Γ4,
the condition stated in (iv), which requires reconstruction of source variables of interest at each sink does not hold
in this case.
1) Random code construction: Consider building the source and key codebooks according to the construction
described in the proof of Theorem 2, i.e., for s ∈ S, let Ms , T (nt)ǫ (Ums), and Ks , T (nt)ǫ (Uks), where
|Ms| , 2nr(k)ms and |Ks| , 2nr
(k)
ks . As before, n denotes the code’s blocklength.
Source s ∈ S picks message Ms and key Ks uniformly at random from Ms and Ks, respectively. Edge
e ∈ Out(s), applies the function ηe, which is specified from by the fact that h(k) ∈ Γ2, symbol-by-symbol to
(Untms , U
nt
ks
), the source builds codeword We = Unte . In other words, for e ∈ Out(s), and i ∈ [1 : nt],
Ue,i = ηe(Ums,i, Uks,i). (56)
After building the message and key codebooks in this manner, the encoding operations are performed as follows.
Each source s ∈ S chooses message Ms and key Ks uniformly at random from sets Ms and Ks, respectively.
Edge e ∈ Out(s) applies function ηe symbol-by-symbol to (Ms,Ks) = (Untms , Untks ) and generates Unte , i.e.,
Ue,i = ηe(Ums,i, Uks,i), for i ∈ [1 : nt]. Unlike the case of variable length coding, where always We is equal to
Unte , in this case, if (Untms , U
nt
ks
) ∈ T (nt)ǫ (Ums , Uks), then We = Unte ; Otherwise, We = 0. Note that by Lemma 1,
if (Untms , U
nt
ks
) ∈ T (nt)ǫ (Ums , Uks), then Unte ∈ T (nt)ǫ (Ue) as well.
Similarly node v ∈ V\(S ∪ T ) constructs We, e ∈ Out(v), as a function of (We′ : e′ ∈ In(v)) as follows.
If there exists an incoming message in the received messages of node v, which is equal to 0, then let We = 0.
Otherwise, node v constructs Unte , such that Ue,i = ηe(Ue′,i : e′ ∈ In(v)), i ∈ [1 : nt]. If UntIn(v) ∈ T (nt)ǫ (UIn(v)),
then We = Unte ; Otherwise, We = 0. Again, by Lemma 1, if UntIn(v) ∈ T (nt)ǫ (UIn(v)) then Unte ∈ T (nt)ǫ (Ue) as
well.
Finally, sink node t ∈ T reconstructs the message Ms, s ∈ β(t), as a function of (We : e ∈ In(t)). Let Mˆs→t
denote the reconstruction of message Ms at t. If at least one of the incoming messages of node v is 0, then it lets
Mˆs→t equal to an arbitrary fixed message from Ms. Otherwise, it looks for Untms ∈Ms such that
(Untms , (U
nt
e )e∈In(t)) ∈ T (nt)ǫt (Ums , UIn(t)),
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and lets Mˆs→t = Untms . If there is no such message, again it lets Mˆs→t equal to an arbitrary predetermined message
from Ms.
Similar to (19), blocklength n is defined as
n ,
⌈
nt(1 + δ)
ak
⌉
, (57)
where
δ , 2max
e∈E
(
(1 + ǫ)(1 + ǫkc
−1
e )
1− ǫc−1e
)
− 2. (58)
Again, for fixed ǫk, choosing nt large enough and ǫ small enough, δ can be made arbitrarily small.
2) Performance evaluation:
i. Source rates: Since Ms = T (nt)ǫ (Ums), for nt large enough, from (1) it follows that
r(k)ms =
log |T (nt)ǫ (Ums)|
n
≥ nt(1− ǫ)
nt(1 + δ) + ak
(rs − ǫk) + ak log(1− ǫ)
nt(1 + δ) + ak
. (59)
Again tuning the parameters ǫk, ǫ and nt appropriately, we can make the right hand side of (59) arbitrarily
close to rs.
ii. Channel capacity constraints: In this case, we have assumed fixed length coding. Hence, to prove that channel
capacity constraints are satisfied, it suffices to show that n−1 log |We| ≤ nce. But, We = T (nt)ǫ (Ue) ∪ {0}.
Therefore,
n−1 log |We| = n−1 log(|T (nt)ǫ (Ue)|+ 1)
(a)
≤ n−1 log |T (nt)ǫ (Ue)|+ n−1|T (nt)ǫ (Ue)|−1
≤ ak(1 + ǫ)
1 + δ
h(k)e + ǫ
≤ ( 1 + ǫ
1 + δ
)(ce + ǫk) + ǫ
(b)
≤ ce, (60)
where (a) follows from log(1 + x) ≤ x, and (b) follows from (58).
iii. Security guarantee: We prove that, for any α ∈ As, n−1I(MS ;Wα) can be made arbitrarily small, as
blocklength grows to infinity. Note that the difference between the coding performed on the edges in this case
and the case studied in the proof of Theorem 2 is that, here, codeword We sent over edge e can sometimes
be empty . This happens when either one of the incoming messages to the tail of e is empty, or UntIn(tail(e))
is not typical. In fact the set of messages carried by the edges in this case can be viewed as the previous set
of messages corrupted by an erasure channel with memory; If an input message of a node is empty, then all
the messages carried by its descendants are zero as well.
Let
Ie , 1We 6=0,
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i.e., Ie is an indicator function that shows whether the messages carried by edge e is empty or not. Note that
We is a function of (Unte , Ie): We = Unte , if Ie = 1, and We = 0, otherwise. Therefore,
n−1I(MS ;Wα) ≤ n−1I(MS ;U (nt)α , Iα)
≤ n−1I(MS ;Untα ) + n−1I(MS ; Iα|Untα )
≤ n−1I(MS ;Untα ) + n−1 log |α|. (61)
In the proof of Theorem 2, we showed that n−1I(MS ;Untα ) can be made arbitrarily small. Since maxα∈As |α|
is fixed and does not grow with n, it follows that we can make n−1I(MS ;Wα) arbitrarily small for any
α ∈ As.
iv. Probability of error: Proving that the probability of error converges to zero as n grows to infinity is involved,
but follows from the straightforward extension of the analysis presented in [23], and we skip that here.
B. Proof of Theorem 5
Let r ∈ R(w)ǫ . We show that r ∈ Rǫ,o. Since r ∈ R(w)ǫ , there exists a family of weakly secure network codes
of increasing blocklength nℓ with message rates r(nℓ)mS and key rates r
(nℓ)
kS
, and a sequence (ǫℓ : ℓ = 1, 2, . . .),
monotonically converging to zero, such that
r(nℓ)ms ≥ rs − ǫℓ, (62)
for all s ∈ S,
1
nℓ
I(MS ;Wα) ≤ ǫℓ, (63)
for all α ∈ As, and
P(Mˆs→t 6= Ms, for some t ∈ T , s ∈ β(t)) ≤ ǫℓ. (64)
For blocklength nℓ, let (M (ℓ)s ,K(ℓ)s )s∈S and (W (ℓ)e )e∈E denote its set of source messages, keys, and edge mes-
sages, respectively. Also, corresponding to each ℓ, define N random variables (Y (ℓ)ms )s∈S , (Y
(ℓ)
ks
)s∈S and (Y (ℓ)e )e∈E
as (46), (47), and (48), and similarly let h(ℓ) denote the entropy function of these N random variables. By the same
arguments presented in the proof of Theorem 3,
n−1ℓ h
(ℓ) ∈ con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ123).
In the fixed-length channel coding paradigm, the Message W (ℓ)e transmitted on edge e satisfies log |W(ℓ)e | ≤ nℓce.
Therefore, H(W(ℓ)e ) = log |W(ℓ)e | ≤ nℓce. Hence, n−1ℓ h(ℓ) ∈ Γ5, and
n−1ℓ h
(ℓ) ∈ con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ1234) ∩ Γ5. (65)
November 17, 2017 DRAFT
26
For every sink node t ∈ T , combining Fano’s inequality and (64) yields
H(M
(ℓ)
β(t)|W (ℓ)In(t)) ≤ 1 + nℓ(
∑
s∈β(t)
r(nℓ)ms ) P(Mˆs→t 6= Ms, for some s ∈ β(t))
≤ 1 + nℓ(
∑
s∈β(t)
r(nℓ)ms )ǫℓ,
or dividing both sides by nℓ
n−1ℓ H(M
(ℓ)
β(t)|W (ℓ)In(t)) ≤ n−1ℓ +
∑
s∈β(t)
r(nℓ)ms ǫℓ. (66)
For any source s ∈ S, if r(nℓ)ms ≥
∑
eı Out(s) ce, then the probability of error gets arbitrarily close to one, for
n large enough. Hence, without loss of generality, we assume that, the rate of source s ∈ S does not exceed its
outgoing edges sum capacity. Then,
∑
s∈β(t)
r(nℓ)ms ≤
∑
s∈S
r(nℓ)ms
≤
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈Out(s)
ce
, cM . (67)
Combining (66) and (67), it follows that
n−1ℓ H(M
(ℓ)
β(t)|W (ℓ)In(t)) = hmβ(t),In(t) − hIn(t)
≤ n−1ℓ + cMǫℓ, (68)
for every t ∈ T .
Given the sequence, (ǫℓ : ℓ = 1, 2, . . .), define the two sequences of sets as
Γ
(ℓ)
4 ,
{
h ∈ HN : hmβ(t),In(t) − hIn(t) ≤ n−1ℓ + cM ǫℓ, ∀ t ∈ T }, (69)
and
Γ
(ℓ)
6 ,
{
h ∈ HN : hmS + hα − hmS ,α ≤ ǫℓ, ∀α ∈ As}. (70)
Note that n−1ℓ h(ℓ) ∈ Γ(ℓ)4 ∩ Γ(ℓ)6 . Therefore, from (65), it follows that
n−1ℓ h
(ℓ) ∈ con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ123) ∩ Γ(ℓ)4 ∩ Γ5 ∩ Γ(ℓ)6 . (71)
The rest of the proof can be done similar to the last steps of the proof of Theorem 3. Let
R(ℓ)ǫ,o , Λ(ProjS(con(Γ∗N ∩ Γ123) ∩ Γ(ℓ)4 ∩ Γ5 ∩ Γ(ℓ)6 )). (72)
By (62), n−1ℓ h(ℓ)s ≥ rs − ǫℓ for all s ∈ S. Combining this with (71) and (72), yields
r− ǫℓ ∈ R(ℓ)o .
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By the same argument we had before,
r− ǫℓ ∈
∞⋂
ℓ′=ℓ
R(ℓ′)ǫ,o .
On the other hand, for any ℓ ≥ 1,
∞⋂
ℓ′=ℓ
R(ℓ′)ǫ,o = Rǫ,o.
Therefore, r− ǫℓ ∈ Ro, for ℓ ≥ 1. Since Ro is a closed set, r ∈ Ro as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the problem of multi-source multi-sink communication over wiretap networks.
We studied both zero and asymptotically zero probability of reconstruction error, and proved that in the case
of asymptotically zero error, the capacity region subject to weak secrecy requirement is equal to the capacity
region subject to strong secrecy requirement. In fact we proved this equivalence for general multi-source multi-
destination wireless networks modeled by discrete memoryless channels. This result implys that equivalence models
derived previously for weak secrecy [10], [11] also hold under strong secrecy constraint. Both for zero-error and
asymptotically zero-error communication, we derived inner and outer bounds on the capacity region subject to weak
secrecy constraint in terms of the intersection of the entropic region and some hyperplanes defined by the network’s
constraints.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We start by a weakly secure code and apply it multiple times. Then we use extractor functions to build a strongly
secure code. The difference with [4] is that here we have multiple sources.
Clearly, R(w)(p(ym|xm),S,A) ⊆ R(s)(p(ym|xm),S,A). We only need to prove that
R(s)(p(ym|xm),S,A) ⊆ R(w)(p(ym|xm),S,A).
To achieve this goal, we start by a weakly secure code, and apply the same code L times. Then, employing extractor
functions to the concatenation of the messages, we construct a strongly secure code.
Let r = (rs : s ∈ S) ∈ R(w)(p(ym|xm),S,A). By definition, for any ǫ > 0 and n large enough, there exists
a weakly secure code of blocklength n and source coding rates (r(n)s : s ∈ S), such that r(n)s ≥ rs − ǫ, for every
s ∈ S, P(Ms 6= Mˆs→t) ≤ ǫ, for s ∈ S and t ∈ Ds, and n−1I(Y nα ;MS) ≤ ǫ, for all α ∈ A.
Consider applying this code L times. For s ∈ S, let Ms,ℓ and Mˆs→t,ℓ denote the message transmitted by source
s and its reconstruction at node t ∈ Ds, respectively, at session ℓ ∈ [1 : L]. By the union bound, P(MˆLs→t 6=
MLs ) ≤ ǫL. Consider modeling the problem as a problem of source coding with side information. Source s has
access to i.i.d. samples of Ms and terminal t observes correlated side information Mˆs→t. By the Fano’s inequality
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[24], H(Ms|Mˆs→t) ≤ nr(n)s ǫ + 1. Hence, by the Slepian-Wolf coding theorem [25], if L is large enough, for any
ǫ1 > 0, source s by sending LH(Ms|Mˆs→t) ≤ L(nr(n)s ǫ + 1) extra bits to all terminal in Ts , {t : s ∈ Ds}, can
ensure that
P(M˜Ls→t 6= MLs ) ≤ ǫ1,
where M˜Ls→t denotes the reconstruction of MLs at terminal t as a function of MˆLs→t and the extra information
received from the Slepian-Wolf coding sessions. Let Os ∈ Os denote the message sent from source s to all
terminals t such that s ∈ β(t). Note that log |Os| ≤ L(nr(n)s ǫ+ 1).
For ǫ2 > 0, define event B as
B , {(MLS , Y nLα ) ∈ T (L)ǫ2 (MS , Y nα ) : for all α ∈ A}.
By the Hoeffding’s inequality [26], for (mS , ynα) ∈
∏
s∈SMs ×
∏
i∈α Yni ,
P
(|π(mS , ynα|MLS , Y nLα )− p(mS , ynα)| ≤ ǫ2p(mS , ynα))
≥ 1− 2−2Lǫ22p(mS ,ynα)+1. (A-1)
Combining (A-1) with the union bound yields
P(Bc) ≤
∑
α∈A
∑
(mS ,y
n
α)∈∏
s∈S
Ms×
∏
i∈α
Yni
2−2Lǫ
2
2p(mS ,y
n
α)+1
≤ |A|
(
2
n
∑
s∈S
r(n)s ∏
i∈V
|Yi|n
)
2−2Lǫ
2
2p
∗+1,
where p∗ , minα∈Amin(mS ,ynα) p(mS , wα). Note that p
∗ > 0 and does not depend on L. Hence,
P(Bc) ≤ 2−γL+η, (A-2)
where γ , 2ǫ22p∗, p∗ , minα∈Amin(mS ,ynα) p(mS , y
n
α) > 0, and η → 0 as L→∞.
Since the original code is assumed to be weakly secure, for any α ∈ A, I(MS ;Y nα ) < ǫn. Therefore, for any
s ∈ S, H(Ms|Y nα ,MS\s) ≥ nr(n)s − nǫ, which due to the independence of the messages yields
H(Ms|Y nα ,MS\s) ≥ nr(n)s − nǫ.
Also, for any α ∈ A, ynLα ∈
∏
i∈α YnLi , if (mLS , ynLα ) ∈ T (L)ǫ2 (MS , Y nα ), then
p(mLs |mLS\s, ynLα ) ≤ 2−L(1−ǫ2)H(Ms|MS\s,Y
n
α ).
Therefore,
H∞(MLs |MLS\s = mLS\s, Y nLα = ynLα ,B)
≥ (1 − ǫ2)LH(Ms|MS\s, Y nα )
≥ (1 − ǫ2)Ln(r(n)s − ǫ). (A-3)
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The error correcting messages OS = (Os : s ∈ S) are sent to the desired users without additional coding to prevent
information leakage to the adversary. The adversary observes random variables correlated by OS through outputs Yα.
By the data processing inequality, the worst case performance from the vewipoint of security is when the adversary
observes the we messages OS = (Os : s ∈ S) instead of their noisy version. For (mLS\s, ynLα ) ∈ T (L)ǫ2 (MS , Y nα ),
by Lemma 4, for any λ > 0, with probability exceeding 1− 2−λ,
H∞(MLs |MLS\s = mLS\s, Y nLα = ynLα , OS = oS ,B)
≥ (1− ǫ2)Ln(r(n)s − ǫ)−
∑
s∈S
log |Os| − λ
≥ (1− ǫ2)Ln(r(n)s − ǫ)− L(n
∑
s′∈S
r
(n)
s′ ǫ+ |S|) − λ
= Lnr(n)s (1− ǫ3), (A-4)
where ǫ3 , 1− (1 − ǫ2)(1 − ǫ/r(n)s ) − (ǫ
∑
s′ r
(n)
s′ − n−1)/r(n)s − λ/(Lnr(n)s ), and can be made arbitrarily small
by choosing L and n large enough and ǫ and ǫ1 appropriately small. Let λ , n+ ⌈logL⌉, and define event Hs as
the event (A-4) holds. Note that P(Hs) ≥ 1− 2−nL−1.
As mentioned before, to convert the weakly secure code into a strongly secure one, we apply Lemma 3. Let Vs
be an independent random variable generated at source s ∈ S, such that Vs = {0, 1}n2,s . By Lemma 3 and (A-4),
for each source s ∈ S and any given δ1, δ2 > 0, there exists an extractor function Es : {0, 1}Lnr(n)s ×{0, 1}ns,2 →
{0, 1}ns,3, such that ns,2 ≤ δ1Lnr(n)s , ns,3 ≥ (1− ǫ3 − δ2)Lnr(n)s ,
H(Es(M
L
s , Vs)|Y nLα = ynLα ,MLS\s = mLS\s,OS = oS , Vs,B,Hs)
≥ ns,3 − 2−
√
Lnr
(n)
s −δs , (A-5)
where δs = o(1). Let ns,3 , (1− δ4)Lnr(n)s .
Let M¯s , Es(MLs , Vs). From the definition of Es, M¯s ∈ M¯s , [1 : 2ns,3], and
H(M¯S |Y nLα , OS , VS)≥
∑
s∈S
H(M¯s|M˜S\s, Y nLα , OS , VS)
(a)
≥
∑
s∈S
H(M¯s|MLS\s, Y nLα , OS , VS)
(b)
=
∑
s∈S
H(M¯s|MLS\s, Y nLα , OS , Vs)
≥
∑
s∈S
H(M¯s|MLS\s, Y nLα , OS , Vs,1B∩Hs)
≥
∑
s∈S
H(M¯s|MLS\s, Y nLα , OS , Vs,B,Hs) P(B ∩Hs) (A-6)
where (a) holds because M¯s is a deterministic function of (MLs , Vs), and (b) holds since VS\s is independent of
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(M¯s,M
L
S\s, Y
nL
α , OS , Vs). Since P(B ∩Hs) ≥ 1− P(Bc)− P(Hcs), it follows from (A-6) that
H(M¯S |Y nLα , OS , VS)
≥
∑
s∈S
H(M¯s|MLS\s, Y nLα , OS , Vs,B,Hs)(1 − 2−nL−1 − 2−γL+η)
(a)
≥
∑
s∈S
(ns,3 − 2−
√
Lnr
(n)
s −δs)(1 − 2−nL−1 − 2−γL+η)
≥
∑
s∈S
ns,3 − ǫ4, (A-7)
where (a) follows from (A-5), and ǫ4 can be made arbitrarily small. Following the same steps used in the above
equations for each s ∈ S yields H(M¯s|Y nLα , OS , VS) ≥ ns,3−ǫ4, and therefore, H(M¯s) ≥ H(M¯s|Y nLα , OS , VS) ≥
ns,3 − ǫ4. Let pus denote the pdf corresponding to the uniform distribution over M¯s. Then, D(pm¯s‖pus) =
ns,3 − H(Ms) ≤ ǫ4, and by Pinsker’s inequality [24], dTV(pm¯s , pus) ≤
√
0.5ǫ4. Therefore, by the maximal
coincidence theorem (Theorem 1.1. in Chapter 4 of [27]), there exists a joint distribution pus,m¯s , such that if
(Us, M¯s) ∼ pus,m¯s , then P(Us 6= M¯s) = dTV(pm¯s , pus) ≤
√
0.5ǫ4. Given M¯s, let Us, the message at source s, be
the random variable generated from the conditional distribution pus|m¯s . Since, for any α ∈ As, US → M¯S → Wα,
therefore, by the data processing inequality [24],
I(US ;Y nLα ) ≤ I(M¯S ;Y nLα ) ≤ ǫ4,
where the last step follows from (A-7).
Finally, we need to compute the effect of the extra communication required for carrying messages (Os : s ∈ S)
and (Vs : s ∈ S). To achieve this goal, we model the correlation between Ms and {Mˆs→t}t∈Ds as a broadcast
channel. Since P(Ms 6= Mˆs→t, for some t ∈ Ds) ≤ |Ds|ǫ, and
P(Ms 6= Mˆs→t, for some t ∈ Ds) =
∑
mS\s∈
∏
v∈S\sMv
P(Ms 6= Mˆs→t, for some t ∈ Ds|MS\s = mS\s)p(mS\s),
there exists m∗S\s ∈
∏
v∈S\sMv, such that P(Ms 6= Mˆs→t, for some t ∈ Ds|MS\s = m∗S\s) ≤ |Ds|ǫ. Again by
the Fano’s inequality, since the messages are independent,
I(Ms; Mˆs→t|MS\s = m∗S\s) ≥ nr(n)s (1 − |Ds|ǫ)− 1
≥ n(rs − ǫ)(1− |Ds|ǫ)− 1, (A-8)
for all t ∈ Ds. Fixing the input messages of nodes in S\s to m∗S\s, consider the broadcast channel from node s to
nodes in Ds, described by p((mˆs→t)t∈Ds |ms,MS\s = mS\s). Since (A-8) holds for every t ∈ Ds, the common
rate capacity of this cannel is at least n(rs − ǫ)(1− |D|ǫ)− 1. To achieve this rate, node s generates its messages
from uniform distribution over Ms. Repeating this process |S| times, all the required extra messages, i.e., OS
and VS , are carried to their intended receivers with arbitrarily small probability of error. Overall, these operations
increase the blocklength from Ln by
∑
s∈S
δ1Lnr
(n)
s + L(nr
(n)
s ǫ+ 1)
(rs − ǫ)(1− |D|ǫ)− n−1 ≤ Lnδ2,
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where δ2 can be made arbitrarily small.
Let M¯s→t, Vs→t and Os→t denote the reconstructions of Us, Vs and Os, at sink node t ∈ Ds, respectively. By
the union bound,
P(Us 6= M¯s→t) ≤ P(Us 6= M¯s) + P(MLs 6= M˜Ls→t) + P((Vs, Os) 6= (Vs→t, Os→t)), (A-9)
which can be made arbitrarily small.
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